http://www.pff.org/remedies.htmCreating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: A Structural Remedy for Microsoft Thomas M. Lenard, Ph.D.Vice President for ResearchThe Progress & Freedom FoundationJanuary 2000TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. INTRODUCTION II. MICROSOFT’S OPERATING SYSTEM MONOPOLY III. NEW MARKET DEVELOPMENTS A. America Online/Netscape Merger B. America Online/ Time Warner Merger C. Linux D. Information Appliances E. Web-Based Computing IV. ANTICOMPETITIVE ACTS: THE NETSCAPE BROWSER A. Market Division Proposal B. Exclusive Arrangements with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) C. Exclusive Arrangements with Internet Access Providers (IAPs) V. OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE ACTS A. Java B. Intel C. IBM VI. HARM TO CONSUMERS VII. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES A. Conduct Remedies B. Structural Remedies 1. Functional Divestiture 2. Full Division Remedy 3. One-Time Licensing Auction VIII. The Hybrid Structural Remedy A. The Minimum Scope of the Windows Company B. The Applications Company C. Addition of Products into the Windows Companies D. Other Operational Issues 1. Shareholders 2. Intellectual Property 3. Employees 4. Contracts 5. Pecuniary Assets and Investments E. Measures to Preserve the Hybrid Structural Remedy IX. BENEFITS OF THE HYBRID REMEDY A. Operating Systems Competition B. Competition in the Applications Market C. Competition in Hardware Platforms D. Browser Competition X. THE OPERATING SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION ISSUE A. Short-Run Compatibility B. Long-Run Compatibility 1. Incentives to retain backward compatibility 2. Incentives to maintain compatibility with each other C. Cooperative Standard-Setting D. Porting Cost Estimates XI. CONCLUSION Acknowledgements ABOUT THE AUTHOR ENDNOTES첨부 파일과거 URLhttp://www.ipleft.or.kr/bbs/view.php?board=ipleft_5&id=163